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ABSTRACT 
 
 
What is the impact of raising the minimum wage on family incomes? Analysing the 
characteristics of low wage workers, I find that those who earn near-minimum wages are 
disproportionately female, unmarried and young, without post-school qualifications and 
overseas born. About one-third of near-minimum wage workers are the sole worker in 
their household. Due to low labour force participation rates in the poorest households, 
minimum wage workers are most likely to be in middle-income households. Using 
various plausible parameters for the effect of minimum wages on hourly wages and 
employment, I estimate the impact of a minimum wage rise on inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Minimum wages are sometimes promoted as a valuable tool in the battle against 
poverty. Yet the effect of minimum wages on the income distribution depends 
crucially upon who earns minimum wages. If minimum wage earners are 
disproportionately teenagers from affluent families then a minimum wage rise will 
have less of an impact on poverty than if minimum wage earners are mostly lone 
parents.  
 
Understanding the distribution of minimum and subminimum wage earners is also 
important for knowing what impact an increase in the minimum wage might have on 
inequality. While there is no disputing the fact that an increase in the wage floor 
reduces inequality among those who keep their jobs, it is possible that minimum 
wages also have disemployment effects. If these effects are sufficiently large, then it 
is conceivable that an increase in the minimum wage might actually reduce the total 
market income received by low-wage workers. The focus of this paper will be to 
analyse the demographic characteristics of minimum wage workers, and how such 
workers are distributed across rich and poor families.  
 
The impact of a minimum wage rise on social welfare of low-income households 
depends on the distribution of minimum wage earners across rich and poor 
households, the elasticity of hourly wages with respect to the minimum wage for 
minimum wage earners in rich households, the elasticity of employment with respect 
to the minimum wage for minimum wage earners in rich households, the elasticity of 
hourly wages with respect to the minimum wage for minimum wage earners in poor 
households, and the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage for 
minimum wage earners in poor households.  
 
If we make the simplifying assumption that the hourly wage and employment 
elasticities are the same for minimum wage earners in rich and poor households, then 
the total impact on social welfare can be summed up by just three parameters: (i) the 
distribution of minimum wage earners across rich and poor households; (ii) the 
elasticity of hourly wages with respect to the minimum wage; and (iii) the elasticity of 
employment with respect to the minimum wage. This paper focuses on estimating the 
first of these parameters: the distribution of minimum wage earners across rich and 
poor households.  
 
Relatively little has been written about the relationship between minimum wages and 
family incomes in Australia. Richardson and Harding (1999) use data from the 1994-
95 Income Distribution Survey to analyse the family characteristics of low-wage 
workers, and reject the suggestion that they are tightly clustered at either end of the 
household income distribution: “Low wage workers are not predominantly the sons 
and daughters of the affluent middle class.... Nor are they predominantly hard pressed 
household heads struggling to put food on the table to feed their families. There are 
some of each of these groups, but they are relatively small in number.” They find that 
the typical low wage worker “works full-time, is of prime age, with no formal 
education qualifications, probably married and disproportionately female. One third 
have dependent children.” Richardson (1998) uses the 1989-90 Survey of Income and 
Housing Costs, and concludes that most low wage workers are in households in the 
bottom half of the income distribution. 
 
Outside Australia, several studies have estimated the impact of minimum wages on 
family incomes. Just prior to the introduction of the United Kingdom minimum wage, 
Metcalf (1999) estimated that most of the impact would be on middle-income 
households, due to low labour-force participation rates in poor households (however, 
he also noted that if the sample was confined to working households, most of the 
impact would be on the poorest). For Brazil, Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2003) 
found no evidence that raising the minimum wage boosted the incomes of poor 
families. And lastly, Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher (1998) used variation in state 
minimum wages across the US, and concluded that higher minimum wages have a 
negative impact on the incomes of poor families, which they attributed to the negative 
effects on employment outweighing the positive impact on hourly wages. 
 
In this study, I use household surveys over the period 1994-2003 to estimate the 
characteristics of low-wage workers and their distribution across family types. To 
presage my results, I find that low-wage and minimum-wage workers are more likely 
to be female, unmarried, without qualifications and overseas-born. Due to low labour 
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force participation rates by poor households, the typical minimum-wage worker is 
likely to live in a middle-income household.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the legal 
operation of Australian minimum wages, and the data to be used. Section 3 identifies 
the demographic characteristics of those workers who earn minimum wages. Section 
4 estimates the distribution of minimum wage earners by family incomes. Section 5 
estimates the impact of a minimum wage rise on inequality given various plausible 
elasticities, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Background and Data 
 
Relative to other nations, Australian minimum wages are high. The Australian federal 
minimum wage is 58% of full-time median weekly earnings, as compared with 45% 
in the United Kingdom and 34% in the United States.1 Relative to median earnings, 
the UK Low Pay Commission (2003) found that Australia’s minimum wage was the 
second-highest among 12 developed countries, with only France having a higher wage 
floor. Assuming a similar distribution of hourly wages in these countries, this suggests 
that the Australian minimum wage will potentially affect more workers than the 
minimum wage in the UK or the US.  
 
The operation of Australian minimum wages is also notoriously complex. The 
Australian federal minimum wage is set by the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) through a process of arbitration, and affects not only those at the 
bottom, but also workers further up the wage distribution.2 Whether an employee is 
covered by the federal minimum depends upon whether he or she is within Federal 
industrial jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction extends to all employees in Victoria, the 
Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory (and hence all are covered by 
the federal minimum wage). In the remaining five states, whether an employee is 
                                                 
1 These estimates are from 2002, based on data in Low Pay Commission (2003). The Commission 
presents two estimates for Australian median wages, one derived from a labour force survey, and 
another derived from an enterprise survey. I use the labour force survey estimate, on the basis that it is 
most directly comparable with median earnings figures from the US Current Population Survey and the 
UK Labour Force Survey. 
2 Several other countries – including Belgium, Greece, and the Scandinavian countries – have 
minimum wages that are set in a similar manner. 
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within the federal industrial jurisdiction depends upon a number of factors, including 
the employee’s industry, and whether the employing company has operations in 
multiple states. However, even if employees are not covered by the federal minimum 
wage, they will typically be within state jurisdiction. In recent years, state industrial 
tribunals have tended to adopt the federal minimum wage, with only a brief delay.  
 
Another complicating factor is the presence of youth wages. Workers aged under 21 
may be paid between 50% and 90% of the minimum. However, since the precise scale 
varies from industry to industry, it is not possible to assign an age-specific minimum 
wage to those aged under 21. 
 
In order to estimate who earns minimum wages, it is necessary to use a dataset that 
contains information on individuals’ earnings and hours, demographic characteristics, 
and household characteristics. For these purposes, I use seven Income Distribution 
Surveys conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.3 These cover the financial 
years 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98, 1999-2000, 2000-01 and 2002-03.4 These 
surveys contain detailed information on demographics, individual and family income, 
employment status, weekly earnings and weekly hours (from which it is possible to 
construct hourly wages).5 Table 1 presents summary statistics. 
 
                                                 
3 Another possible dataset would have been the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) survey, conducted in 2001-03. However, an advantage of the Income Distribution Surveys is 
that they allow comparison over a longer time period. 
4 The survey was not conducted in 1998-99 or 2001-02.  
5 For 2000-01 and 2002-03, weekly hours are collapsed into two-hour bands, and I code hours at the 
midpoint of the band. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD N 
Female 0.508 0.500 100267 
Married 0.603 0.489 100267 
No qualifications 0.046 0.209 100267 
Still at school 0.120 0.325 100267 
Higher degree 0.288 0.453 100267 
Other qualifications 0.546 0.498 100267 
Age 42.485 17.334 100267 
Overseas born 0.268 0.443 100267 
Employed 0.589 0.492 100267 
Hours 35.992 12.315 50526 
Hourly wage (employed only) 16.202 8.228 50526 
Weekly earnings (zero if not employed) 303.040 408.390 100267 
Hourly minimum wage 9.532 0.632 100267 
 
Following convention, what I refer to as the minimum wage was the Metals C14 
award until 1996, and the ‘Living Wage’ from 1997 onwards. Australian minimum 
wages are generally expressed in terms of the wage paid for a 38-hour week, and I 
convert this to an hourly wage. Figure 1 depicts the 40 percent rise in the nominal 
value of the federal minimum wage that occurred over the period 1994-2004 (from 
$8.77 to $12.30), which equates to a 15 percent rise in the real value of the federal 
minimum wage (from $10.76 to $12.30).6
 
                                                 
6 For deflation purposes, I use a consumer price index that excludes mortgage interest payments and 
taxation. This CPI is selected since it does not take account of changes in interest rates and tax reforms. 
Most importantly, since consumers and businesses were largely compensated for the rise in prices that 
occurred with the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax on 1 July 2000, it is necessary to use a 
CPI that is purged of the GST effect. 
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Figure 1: Federal Minimum Wage, 1994-2004
 
 
In what follows, I assign each individual the federal minimum wage that prevailed in 
December of the financial year in which the survey was conducted (for example, 
those surveyed in 2002-03 are assigned the federal minimum wage prevailing in 
December 2002). I then define subminimum wages as those whose hourly wage is 
below the federal minimum wage, but more than half the federal minimum.7 Those 
with hourly wages below the federal minimum wage may be covered by state 
jurisdiction, or may be on federal youth wages. Alternatively, they may be covered by 
the federal minimum wage, but employed illegally, or they may have misreported 
hours or earnings. I also define a category of ‘minimum wage workers’, as those 
earning above the minimum wage by a margin of up to $2 per hour. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the proportion of the workforce earning near-minimum wages 
changed over the period 1994-2002. During this period, the fraction of the labour 
force earning subminimum wages stayed steady at around 13 percent; but the 
proportion earning up to $2 over the minimum fell from 15 percent to around 10 
percent. 
                                                 
7 3% of workers reported hourly wages below half the federal minimum wage. These are omitted on the 
basis that they are likely to involve misreported hours or earnings. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of the Workforce
Earning Near-Minimum Wages
 
 
In what follows, the characteristics of subminimum and minimum wage workers are 
compared with two groups: the adult population, and the employed population. Which 
is the more appropriate comparison group depends in part on whether minimum 
wages are regarded chiefly as an employment policy or an antipoverty policy. In some 
instances, I also present a third specification – working-age adults – which is 
conceptually midway between using all adults and all workers. 
 
3. Demographic Characteristics of Minimum Wage Earners 
 
What are the demographic characteristics of those who earn minimum and 
subminimum wages? To answer this question, I create two indicator variables, one of 
which denotes whether an individual earns subminimum wages, and the other which 
denotes whether he or she earns minimum wages (as defined above). Where Z is a 
vector of demographic characteristics, and δt is a survey-specific fixed effect, I use a 
probit regression to estimate: 
 
P(Earns subminimum wage)i = F(Zi) + δt + εi    (1) 
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P(Earns minimum wage)i = F(Zi) + δt + εi     (2) 
 
The results are shown in Table 2, with the regressions estimated for the employed 
population (columns 1 and 2), and for all adults (columns 3 and 4). To make the 
results more readily interpretable, subminimum wage workers are excluded when 
focusing on minimum wage workers.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 indicate that women, young workers, and those without 
post-school qualifications (the excluded education category) are more likely to be 
earning just below or above the minimum wage. These findings are similar to those of 
Richardson and Harding (1999) using just the 1994-95 survey, However, in contrast 
to Richardson and Harding, I observe that unmarried workers are more likely to earn 
minimum wages than married workers (although the coefficient on the 
Female*Married term is positive, it is still smaller than the Married coefficient).  
 
Conditional on being in the workforce, adults with dependent children are slightly 
more likely to earn subminimum wages, but no more likely to earn minimum wages. 
As Figure 2 showed, older workers are less likely to earn the minimum wage than 
younger workers. Overseas born workers are also more likely to earn minimum 
wages. This may be due to labour market discrimination, but it is also possible that 
the overseas born variable is capturing factors – such as English proficiency and 
education quality – that are not directly measured in the surveys.  
 
The last two columns in Table 2 compare subminimum and minimum wage workers 
to the entire population.  While the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are driven only by 
the relative position of different workers in the wage distribution, those in columns 3 
and 4 coefficients are driven by two effects – the probability of being in the 
workforce, and (conditional on being in the workforce) the probability of earning low 
wages. Because those with children and those born overseas are less likely to be in the 
workforce, the sign on these coefficients in columns 3 and 4 is reversed. Similarly, 
because married workers are more likely to be in the workforce, this coefficient is 
now indistinguishable from zero. 
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Table 2: Who earns the minimum wage? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Subminimum 
wage worker 
Minimum 
wage worker 
Subminimum 
wage worker 
Minimum 
wage worker 
Sample: Employed Employed All All 
Female 0.004 0.029*** 0.002 0.010*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] 
Married -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] 
Has Children 0.018*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.014*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] 
Female*Married 0.024*** 0.022*** -0.001 0 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] 
Female*Has 
Children 0.013** 0.005 0 -0.010*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] 
Still at school 0.030*** -0.061*** -0.027*** -0.045*** 
 [0.009] [0.007] [0.001] [0.001] 
University degree -0.058*** -0.095*** -0.020*** -0.033*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Other 
qualifications -0.027*** -0.048*** -0.006*** -0.011*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] 
Age -0.084*** -0.055*** -0.035*** -0.016*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] 
Age2 1.855*** 1.174*** 0.809*** 0.398*** 
 [0.070] [0.076] [0.021] [0.027] 
Age3 -0.129*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.034*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002] 
Overseas born 0.010*** 0.018*** -0.003*** 0 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] 
Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58716 52308 100267 93859 
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.09 
Observed Prob. 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.07 
Note: Omitted education group is workers with no qualifications. Coefficients are marginal 
probabilities from a probit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Age2 is divided by 1000. Age3 
is divided by 10000. Workers with wages less than half the minimum wage are omitted from the 
calculations. Subminimum wage workers are excluded from columns 2 and 4. Children are defined as 
dependents aged under 15. 
 
The results from Table 2 suggest two demographic factors that are worth exploring 
further: age effects and family structure effects.  
 
In Figure 3, I plot the age distribution of subminimum and minimum wage workers 
against two comparison groups – the adult population and the employed population. 
Subminimum and minimum wage workers tend to be younger than both the 
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population and the workforce. While the median age of adults is 42, and the median 
age of those employed is 37, the median age of subminimum wage workers is 21 
(interquartile range: 18–37), and the median age of minimum wage workers is 32 
(interquartile range: 23–42). Teenagers comprise 41% of subminimum wage workers 
and 9% of minimum wage workers; while those aged 15-24 account for 57% of 
subminimum wage workers and 32% of minimum wage workers. 
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Figure 3: Age Distribution of
Subminimum and Minimum Wage Workers
 
 
Figure 4 shows how subminimum and minimum wage workers are spread across 
family types. Families are divided into four basic types: couples with dependents, 
couples only, single parents with dependents, and single person households.  
 
As compared with the full adult population, subminimum wage workers are 
overrepresented among couples with dependents, while both subminimum wage 
workers and minimum wage workers are overrepresented among single person 
households. Both subminimum and minimum wage workers are underrepresented in 
couple-only households. 
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As compared with the employed population, subminimum wage workers are still 
overrepresented among single person households, but are underrepresented among 
couples with dependents and couple-only households. 
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Is the typical subminimum and minimum wage worker is the sole breadwinner in their 
household? One way of answering this question is to estimate the number of wage-
earners in the household of the typical minimum wage worker. About one-third – 38% 
of subminimum wage workers, and 33% of minimum wage workers – are the sole 
employed person in their household. The remaining two-thirds are in multiple-earner 
households.  
 
Restricting the sample to subminimum and minimum wage workers in multiple-earner 
households, I rank household members from the highest hourly wage to the lowest 
hourly wage. In such cases, only 30% subminimum wage workers and 42% of 
minimum wage workers are the highest-earning workers in their households. In cases 
where subminimum and minimum wage workers are in multiple-earner households, 
most are so-called ‘secondary earners’.  
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4. Family income of minimum wage earners 
 
Another way of asking the question ‘who gets minimum wages?’ is to consider the 
relationship between family income and hourly wages. To do this, I calculate the 
equivalized family income for each individual by dividing total annual post-tax family 
income from all sources by the square root of the number of family members. For 
each year, I then calculate where each individual falls on the family income 
distribution. This is then compared to the individual’s position on the hourly wage 
distribution. Results are shown by quintiles, with the bottom hourly wage quintile 
approximately corresponding to subminimum and minimum wage earners. 
 
Table 3 shows the results from this exercise. As might be expected, individuals in 
poor families are disproportionately likely to be out of the labour force. 
Correspondingly, most of those who are not working are in a family that is in one of 
the bottom two quintiles. If individuals from poor households are in the labour force, 
there is a greater than 50% chance that they will be in the bottom quintile of hourly 
wage earners. But because most of those in the poorest households are out of the 
labour force, the bottom quintile of hourly wage earners is less skewed towards poor 
households than might be expected. The median low-wage worker is in a middle-
income households, and only slightly more low-wage earners are found in bottom 
40% households than in top 40% households.  
 
Note that the results in Panel A include retirees, and it might be argued – on the basis 
that minimum wages are only intended to have an effect on working-age households – 
that these individuals should be excluded from the analysis. Panel B therefore restricts 
the sample to individuals aged 55 and under. This has only a small impact on the 
distribution, with the fraction of low-wage workers in the poorest families rising from 
19 percent to 23 percent. Lastly, Panel C further restricts the sample by excluding 
households in which no adult is employed (note that this does not require that the 
respondent themselves be employed). In this specification, 35 percent of low-wage 
workers are in the poorest families, and 25 percent are in the second-poorest quintile 
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of families, placing the median low-wage worker is in the second quintile of the 
family income distribution.8  
 
Table 3: Distribution of hourly wages and family income 
Panel A: Aged 15 and over
  Equivalized family income quintile  
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
 Not 
employed 32.76 32.98 17.48 9.65 7.13 100 
 1 19.26 20.18 26.35 20.13 14.09 100
Hourly 2 7.62 14.44 32.33 27.53 18.09 100
Wage 3 5.55 9.92 24.73 34.96 24.83 100
quintile 4 3.20 5.38 17.92 33.70 39.80 100
 5 2.43 2.71 11.30 24.13 59.42 100
Panel B: Aged 15-55
  Equivalized family income quintile  
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
 Not 
employed 
40.09 26.77 15.19 10.14 7.81 100 
 1 23.33 27.80 21.64 16.00 11.24 100
Hourly 2 9.45 23.77 31.12 21.53 14.13 100
Wage 3 6.86 17.60 27.21 27.96 20.37 100
quintile 4 4.03 11.01 19.25 32.85 32.87 100
 5 2.88 5.47 14.08 24.42 53.14 100
Panel C: In a household with at least one employed person
  Equivalized family income quintile  
  1 2 3 4 5 Total 
 Not 
employed 26.26 28.59 18.82 14.43 11.90 100 
 1 34.53 24.64 17.56 13.99 9.28 100
Hourly 2 17.63 26.29 25.83 18.48 11.78 100
Wage 3 12.15 20.06 27.10 23.26 17.43 100
quintile 4 6.64 14.21 20.45 30.27 28.44 100
 5 4.32 7.86 14.52 24.31 49.00 100
Note: Family income is the family’s total post-tax income in the previous financial year, equivalized by 
dividing by the square root of the number of family members. Workers with wages less than half the 
federal minimum wage are omitted from the calculations. Note that in Panel C, it is not necessary that 
the respondent be employed, only that some member of his or her family is employed. 
 
Figure 5 carried out a similar exercise, now focusing separately on workers who earn 
subminimum or minimum wages (roughly equivalent to those in the bottom quartile 
of the hourly wage distribution). Three comparisons are presented in Figure 5 – 
comparing near-minimum wage workers to the entire adult population, comparing 
them to the adult population aged 15-55, and comparing them to households where at 
                                                 
8 For all specifications shown in Table 3, weighting by the number of hours worked makes no 
substantive difference to the results. 
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least one person is employed. In each case, a horizontal line at 0.01 denotes the 
distribution of the comparison population, which is, by construction, uniform.  
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Figure 5: Family Income Distribution of
Subminimum and Minimum Wage Workers
 
 
As with the results shown in Table 3, Figure 5 indicates that low labour force 
participation rates among poor households means that subminimum and minimum 
wage workers tend to be clustered around the middle of the family income 
distribution. The median subminimum wage worker is at the 44th percentile of the 
entire adult distribution, the 35th percentile of the distribution of adults aged 15-55, 
and the 27th percentile among working households. The median minimum wage 
worker is at the 54th percentile of the entire adult distribution, the 46th percentile of 
the distribution of adults aged 15-55, and the 39th percentile of working households.  
 
Figure 6 shows the most recent year, 2002-03. Recall that since the fraction of those 
earning near-minimum wages fell in this year (Figure 2), one might expect those still 
earning subminimum and minimum wages to be lower in the family income 
distribution than in previous years. Figure 6 shows this to be the case, though the 
difference is not more than a few percentile ranks. In 2002-03, the median 
subminimum wage worker is at the 42nd percentile of the entire adult distribution, the 
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34th percentile of the distribution of adults aged 15-55, and the 26th percentile of 
working households. The median minimum wage worker is at the 51st percentile of 
the entire adult distribution, the 43rd percentile of the distribution of adults aged 15-
55, and the 36th percentile of working households. 
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5. How Does Raising the Minimum Wage Affect Inequality? 
 
A final consideration is how raising the minimum wage might affect inequality. As 
noted in section 1, if we assume that elasticities do not vary across family income 
groups, there are three relevant parameters in determining the impact of a minimum 
wage rise on the distribution of incomes: the hourly wage elasticity, the employment 
elasticity, and the distribution of minimum wage earners across households.  
 
While there is a robust debate in the Australian literature over the elasticities, most 
estimates of the hourly wage elasticity lie between 0 and 1, while most estimates of 
the labour demand elasticity (extensive and intensive margins combined) lie between 
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0 and -1.9 The effect of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is therefore 
approximately bounded by the status quo (no effect), and the following three 
scenarios: 
      
(i) ε(Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=0: Hourly wages of minimum wage workers rise by 
10 percent, no effect on employment of minimum wage workers. This 
might occur if minimum wage industries are characterized by 
monopsonistic hiring. 
(ii) ε(Wage)=0 & ε(LD)=-1: Hourly wages of minimum wage workers do not 
rise, employment of minimum wage workers falls by 10 percent. This 
might occur if workers are heterogeneous and are always paid their 
marginal product. 
(iii) ε(Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=-1: Hourly wages of minimum wage workers rise by 
10 percent and employment of minimum wage workers falls by 10 percent 
 
Using data from the 2002-03 survey, it is therefore possible to estimate the effect on 
inequality under each of these four scenarios, by estimating the baseline income 
distribution, and then simulating the effect of giving minimum wage workers a 10 
percent pay rise, firing a random 10 percent of minimum wage workers, or both. I 
then estimate the impact on the distribution of hourly wages, the distribution of 
individuals’ weekly earnings, and the distribution of equivalized post-tax family 
income. 
 
In carrying out such an exercise, the question naturally arises as to how zero wages or 
incomes should be treated, given that most inequality measures ignore zero values. If 
under a particular simulation a worker loses his or her job, should her wage/earnings 
be taken into account in calculating the inequality measure? I opt here for a halfway 
solution, in which those who are simulated to have lost their jobs are coded to have 
zero hourly wages (which are then ignored in calculating hourly wage inequality), but 
                                                 
9 In Australia, the leading estimates of the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the minimum 
wage are Daley et al 1998 (-2.0 to -5.0 for teenagers); Leigh 2003, 2004a (-0.3 for all persons, -1.0 for 
persons aged 15-24); Harding and Harding 2004 (-0.2 for all persons);  Mangan and Johnston 1999 (0 
to -0.3 for teenagers); Junankar, Waite and Bellchamber 2000 (zero for teenagers). I am not aware of 
any estimates of the elasticity of hourly wages with respect to the Australian minimum wage. Neumark, 
Schweitzer and Wascher 2004 estimate that the elasticity of minimum wage workers’ hourly wages 
with respect to the US minimum wage is 0.8. 
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weekly earnings of $0.001 (which are then taken into account for the purposes of 
calculating weekly earnings inequality). 
 
Table 4 shows the effects on the distribution of individuals’ hourly wages, 
individuals’ weekly earnings, and equivalized total pre-tax family income (including 
non-wage income). Panel A uses the gini coefficient, the most commonly-used 
measure of income distribution, which is most sensitive to movement around the 
mode of the distribution. Panel B uses the Atkinson index, with an inequality aversion 
parameter of 1, which is more sensitive to the bottom of the distribution. Panel C 
estimates the share of observations that fall below half the median, a commonly used 
estimate of relative poverty. For specifications (ii) and (iii), in which a randomly 
selected 10 percent of minimum wage workers lose their jobs, estimates are averaged 
over 50 replications of the simulation. 
 
Table 4: How does the minimum wage affect inequality? 
Simulated 10 percent minimum wage rise under various elasticity assumptions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Individuals’ 
Hourly 
Wages 
Individuals’ 
Weekly 
Earnings 
Equivalized 
Pre-Tax 
Family 
Income 
Panel A: Gini Coefficient
Status Quo 0.250 0.338 0.376 
(i)  ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=0 0.239 0.330 0.374 
(ii)  ε(Hourly Wage)=0 & ε(LD)=-1 0.247 0.349 0.381 
(iii) ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=-1 0.237 0.342 0.379 
Panel B: Atkinson Index (e=1) 
Status Quo 0.097 0.216 0.228 
(i)  ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=0 0.088 0.207 0.227 
(ii)  ε(Hourly Wage)=0 & ε(LD)=-1 0.095 0.404 0.270 
(iii) ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=-1 0.087 0.398 0.269 
Panel C: Share Below Half the Median (Relative Poverty Line)
Status Quo 0.051 0.173 0.217 
(i)  ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=0 0.035 0.163 0.223 
(ii)  ε(Hourly Wage)=0 & ε(LD)=-1 0.049 0.186 0.220 
(iii) ε(Hourly Wage)=1 & ε(LD)=-1 0.033 0.177 0.224 
Notes:  
1. ε(Hourly Wage) denotes the elasticity of hourly wages with respect to the minimum wage, for 
minimum wage workers; ε(LD) denotes the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the 
minimum wage, for minimum wage workers.  
2. Minimum wage workers are defined as those earning under the minimum wage, and up to $2 over 
the minimum wage.  
3. The treatment of zero incomes differs between column 1 and columns 2 and 3. For example, if a 
simulated individual loses her job, her hourly wage is recoded to zero (and she is therefore 
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excluded from the hourly wage inequality calculations). But her weekly income is recoded to 
$0.001, so she is included in the hourly wage inequality calculation.  
4. In column 3, family income is equivalized by dividing by the square root of the number of family 
members. 
5. In all estimates, the unit of observation is the individual.  
6. Simulations (ii) and (iii) involve randomly firing 10 percent of minimum wage workers, so 
estimates are based on 50 replications of the simulation. 
 
Under all scenarios and inequality measures, an increase in the minimum wage 
reduces hourly wage inequality (recall that zero hourly wages are ignored). Even in 
the event that an increase in the minimum wage has only a disemployment effect, and 
has no impact on hourly wages, it will still have the effect of reducing hourly wage 
dispersion among those who remain employed.  
 
For individual weekly earnings, the impact differs substantially across the various 
scenarios. If raising the minimum wage induces a large hourly wage response and no 
employment response (scenario i), then the distribution of weekly earnings will 
become slightly more equal. However, if it induces no hourly wage response and a 
large employment response (scenario ii), the distribution will become much more 
unequal. In the event that raising the minimum wage induces a large response in both 
hourly wages and employment (scenario iii), then the disemployment effect will 
overwhelm the hourly wage effect. The results for scenario (iii) make intuitive sense: 
since firings have a much larger impact on the income distribution than modest wage 
rises. The extent of the rise in inequality under the third scenario depends on the 
inequality parameter used. Under the gini and the relative poverty measure, the rise is 
only modest, but the Atkinson index, which is more sensitive to the bottom of the 
distribution, rises from 0.216 to 0.398.  
 
Lastly, I estimate the impact on equivalized pre-tax income. Because this is estimated 
at the household level (and includes non-wage income), the impact of the minimum 
wage on income inequality is more muted than on hourly wage inequality or earnings 
inequality. However, the patterns mostly remain the same: using the gini or the 
Atkinson index, inequality falls under the first scenario, and rises under the second 
and third scenarios. Interestingly, when relative poverty is used as the benchmark, 
income inequality rises under all scenarios, reflecting the fact that few households in 
the bottom quartile of the family income distribution benefit from a minimum wage 
rise.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Those who earn near-minimum wages in Australia are disproportionately female, 
unmarried and young, without post-school qualifications and overseas born. The age 
distribution of subminimum wage workers peaks around 21, while the age distribution 
of minimum wage workers peaks around 32. Across family types, subminimum and 
minimum wage workers are overrepresented in single-person families, and 
underrepresented in couple-only households. About one-third of subminimum and 
minimum wage workers are the sole breadwinner in their household. 
 
Not surprisingly, there is a positive correlation between hourly wages and size-
equivalized family incomes. If a poor family has an adult in the labour force, that 
person is very likely to be earning low wages. However, due to low labour force 
participation rates in the poorest families, the median subminimum and minimum 
wage worker resides in a middle-income family. This remains true if the sample is 
restricted to working-age families, though if it is restricted to families with an adult in 
the workforce, subminimum and minimum wage workers are further towards the 
bottom of the family income distribution. 
 
These findings have implications for the impact of minimum wage changes on the 
distribution of income. Simulating the effect of a minimum wage rise on the 
distribution of income assuming a large positive hourly wage elasticity and a zero 
labour demand elasticity, earnings inequality and income inequality fall. Assuming a 
zero hourly wage elasticity and a large negative labour demand elasticity, earnings 
inequality and income inequality rise. And assuming a large positive hourly wage 
elasticity and a large negative labour demand elasticity, simulations also suggest that 
earnings inequality and income inequality will rise.  
 
 19
References 
 
Daley, A., Nguyen-Hong, D., Eldridge, D., Gabbitas, O. and McCalman, P. 1998. 
‘Youth Wages and Employment’, Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, 
Canberra: AusInfo 
 
Harding, D. and Harding, G. 2004. ‘Minimum wages in Australia: an analysis of the 
impact on small and medium sized businesses’, Report to the Department of 
Employment and Workplace Relations, Turning Point Research Pty Ltd 
 
Junankar, P.N., Waite, M. and Bellchamber, G. 2000. ‘The Youth Labour Market: 
Anecdotes, Fables and Evidence’ Economic and Labour Relations Review 11: S159-
S186 
 
Leigh, A. 2003. ‘Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment’ Australian Economic Review 36(4): 361-373  
 
Leigh, A. 2004a. ‘Minimum Wages and Employment: Erratum’ Australian Economic 
Review 37(1): 102-105 
 
Low Pay Commission. 2003. The National Minimum Wage: Fourth Report of the Low 
Pay Commission. London: The Stationery Office 
 
Mangan, J and Johnston, J. 1999. ‘Minimum wages, training wages and youth 
employment’. International Journal of Social Economics 26: 415-429 
 
Metcalf, D. 1999. ‘The Low Pay Commission and the National Minimum 
Wage’,.Economic Journal, 109: F46-F66 
 
Neumark, D., Cunningham, W. and Siga, L.. 2003. ‘The Distributional Effects of 
Minimum Wages in Brazil: 1996-2001’, Public Policy Institute of California Working 
Paper No. 2003.23. San Francisco, CA: PPIC 
 
Neumark, D, Schweitzer, M.E. and Wascher, W. 1998. “The Effects of Minimum 
Wages on the Distribution of Family Incomes: A Non-Parametric Analysis” NBER 
Working Paper 6536. Cambridge, MA: NBER 
 
Neumark, D., Schweitzer, M.E. and Wascher, W. 2004. ‘‘Minimum Wage Effects 
Throughout the Wage Distribution’’ Journal of Human Resources 39: 425-50 
 
Richardson, S. 1998. “Who Gets Minimum Wages?” Journal of Industrial Relations 
40(4): 554-579 
 
Richardson, S and Harding, A. 1999. ‘Poor Workers? The Link Between Low Wages, 
Low Family Income and the Tax and Transfer Systems’ in S. Richardson (ed) 
Reshaping the Labour Market: Regulation, Efficiency and Equality in Australia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 122-158 
 20
